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COMPOUNDING THE ABUSE: FAMILY VIOLENCE, DAMAGES AND THE 
TENANCY TRIBUNAL  
 
Bridgette Toy-Cronin*  
 
In cases where family violence has caused damage to a rented home, a tenant-victim is 
often found to be liable for that damage. This article considers the interpretation of the 
Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) that leads to that result and proposes an alternative 
interpretation for the family violence context that would achieve fairer outcomes without 
the need for legislative change. The drafting of the RTA allows space for an interpretation 
that both takes into account the context of family violence and the policy attempts to prevent 
family violence. Such a reading acknowledges that not everyone has the physical and social 
power to control who comes into their home and what they do once admitted. Interpreting 
the RTA to recognise the realities of family violence would ensure that tenancy law and 
practice supports the strategy of keeping victims of family violence safe.  
  
I INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this: A woman’s ex-partner has a history of being violent towards her. The police 
have been called, either by her or her neighbour, on a number of occasions when he has 
been at the house and been violent. She has been trying to avoid him but one night he calls, 
begging to come over. She is reluctant but relents when he is apologetic and says he just 
wants to talk things through. During the evening he becomes enraged, yelling at her, 
punching a hole in the door and slamming her repeatedly into the walls. She flees to her 
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neighbours. The next day, she tells the landlord about the damage; she is the sole tenant. 
The landlord tells her the damage and disturbance are unacceptable and she and her three 
kids need to move out. He says the money to repair the damage can come out of the bond. 
She thinks there is not much she can do so she moves out but with no money for another 
bond, she and her kids have to stay in her aunt’s garage. From a legal perspective, she is 
right – there is not much she can do. If she were to challenge her landlord’s decision, it is 
unlikely she would succeed; the Tenancy Tribunal would find in favour of the landlord, 
terminate the tenancy and order her to pay for the damages.  
 
In this article, I consider the interpretation of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (RTA) 
that leads to this result. I then propose an alternative interpretation, for the family violence 
context, that would achieve fairer outcomes without the need for legislative change. In 
doing so, I consider both the context of damage caused as the result of family violence and 
the coordinated state effort to combat family violence.1 Such a coordinated response can 
be undermined by law and practice that is adjacent to, but intersects with, family violence, 
such as the implementation of the RTA.2 I therefore consider how the RTA as it stands now 
can be interpreted to ensure it does not undermine this strategy, or if necessary, be reformed 
to support the overall strategy.  
 
Family violence is a gendered pattern of harm with most victims being female and most 
perpetrators being male.3 My analysis pays attention to the lived experience of women and 
can be situated as a feminist critique.4 A focus on lived experience meshes with my 
philosophical commitment to examining the civil law in the everyday lives of New 
Zealanders. Most people’s encounters with the law are not in the appellate jurisdictions – 
  
1 Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach 
to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk (New Zealand Government, 2017). 
2 Erin Adamson, Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh "The Impact of Adjacent Laws on 
Implementing Violence Against Women Laws: Legal Violence in the Lives of Costa Rican Women" (2020) 
45(2) Law and Social Inquiry 432. 
3 Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach 
to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk (New Zealand Government, 2017) at 20. 
4 This feminist critique is influenced by Elisabeth McDonald and others (eds) Feminist Judgments of 
Aotearoa New Zealand Te Rino: A Two-Stranded Rope (Hart, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2017).  
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the arena where the study of law is generally focused – but in the tribunals and alternative 
dispute resolution systems that make up the vast majority of our civil justice system. This 
study focusses at the level that often goes unexplored: the application of law in the high-
volume tribunal system. 
A. Family Violence and Tenancy 
Before going on to examine the specific example of how responsibility for damage and 
family violence intersect, it is worth pausing to consider the intersection between tenancy 
law and family violence more generally. Family violence – also called “domestic violence” 
and referred to in some forms as “intimate partner violence” (IPV) (family violence 
between intimate partners) – is a widespread problem in New Zealand, which has one of 
the highest rates in the world.5 Almost one in every six adult New Zealanders experience 
IPV at some point in their lives but victimisation is more common in some groups.6 Those 
more likely to experience IPV include “those having low household income ($10,001–
$20,000) and struggling financially (very limited ability/couldn’t afford a $300 non-
essential item, couldn’t meet a $500 unexpected expense without borrowing)”.7 Research 
that analysed unpublished data from the “New Zealand Violence Against Women” study 
found that:8 
… where the household income was less than $25,000, 54 percent of women had 
experienced physical or sexual IPV in their lifetime, compared with 26 percent of 
women whose household income was greater than $100,000. 
  
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Society at a Glance 2019: OECD 
Social Indicators (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019) at 127; Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk 
Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk 
(New Zealand Government, 2017) at 1. The terminology in the area is the subject of debate. New Zealand 
policy and legislation uses “family violence” and I therefore adopt that term here, even though most of the 
cases I discuss use “domestic violence”. 
6 Ministry of Justice New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey: Key Findings (Descriptive Statistics) (Ministry 
of Justice, Cycle 2 October 2018 to September 2019) at 67.  
7 Ministry of Justice New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey: Key Findings (Descriptive Statistics) (Ministry 
of Justice, Cycle 2 October 2018 to September 2019) at 67–68.  
8 Sandra Milne and others "Economic Abuse in New Zealand: Towards an understanding and response" 
(Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand, 2018) at 10. 
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Those with low incomes are also more likely to be in rented housing.9 It is therefore 
unsurprising that those renting either a local/central government social housing property or 
a private property are significantly more likely to experience IPV.10 In addition to IPV, 
people living in local or central government social housing properties are also significantly 
more likely to experience violent interpersonal offences and offences committed by family 
members.11  
 
This intersection between tenancy and family violence is recognised in some areas of 
tenancy law.12 There has been specific law reform to enable the assignment of a lease to a 
victim where the perpetrator is required to move out of the home.13 Family violence has 
  
9 See Alan Johnson, Philippa Howden-Chapman and Shamubeel Eaqub A Stocktake of New Zealand’s 
Housing (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2018). 
10 Ministry of Justice New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey: Key Findings (Descriptive Statistics) (Ministry 
of Justice, Cycle 2 October 2018 to September 2019) at 67–68.  
11  Ministry of Justice New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey: Key Findings (Descriptive Statistics) 
(Ministry of Justice, Cycle 2 October 2018 to September 2019) at 60–62. 
12 A note on the use of case names in this article: Tenancy Tribunal orders are usually published with the full 
names of the tenant and landlord. This is highly problematic and has been the subject of attempts at law 
reform, as it leads to housing discrimination; Matthew Desmond and Monica Bell "Housing, Poverty, and 
the Law" (2015) 11(1) Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15 at 19: Desmond and Bell refer to it as 
the “violence of record keeping” which facilitates inequality and disproportionately impacts the already 
marginalised. In their report, “The People’s Review of Renting”, Renters United (a renters’ advocacy group) 
and ActionStation (a community campaign organisation) called for reform that would allow tenants to bring 
cases without making their name public, arguing that this would “reduce fear of retribution for bringing 
cases”: Renters United and ActionStation “The People’s Review of Renting” (2017) at 13. This has been 
partially successful with the Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill 2020, cl 54 allowing greater powers of 
suppression. In particular, various bodies maintain databases of tenants who have appeared in the Tenancy 
Tribunal, including where the tenant is the applicant. See for example 
<http://www.tenancy.co.nz/tenantcheck/>, which boasts that it can provide access to more Tenancy Tribunal 
cases than “any other system” (i.e. it stores cases beyond the limit that the Ministry of Justice system currently 
applies). These are used by property management companies and landlords to select – and discriminate 
against – tenants. To minimise the possibility of this article being data that could be used against tenants, I 
have abbreviated all tenant names to initials where the case is not one of the reported cases or one already 
commonly cited in the literature.  
13 Family Violence Act 2018, ss 121–126 (previously Domestic Violence Act 1995, ss 56–61). Early versions 
of this legislation appear in the Domestic Protection Act 1982, with the current provisions being found in the 
Family Violence Act 2018. J v J [2018] NZTT Whangarei 4158692 involves rent arrears where the landlord 
leased the property to his brother and sister-in-law but the tenancy was then vested in the sister-in-law under 
5  
 
also been recognised as a ground for the victim to reduce the term of a fixed-term tenancy 
and, therefore, to be free to leave the fixed-term tenancy.14 A recent amendment to the RTA 
allowed termination of a lease with two days’ notice where the tenant has to leave for 
safety.15 
 
In other respects, however, family violence makes victims vulnerable to losing their 
tenancies and being liable for payments. A search of Tenancy Tribunal orders illustrates 
the relationship: ordering a property has been abandoned without reasonable excuse where 
the tenant-victim has fled family violence (with consequent liability for disposal of goods 
and rent);16 family violence as interfering with the peace and comfort of people in the 
neighbourhood as justifying termination of the tenancy;17 and family violence as anti-social 
behaviour triggering termination under the COVID-19 Response (Urgent Management 
Measures) Legislation Act 2020.18 
 
  
s 57 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995. The sister-in-law did not pay any further rent and was found to owe 
her brother-in-law $3,900 in arrears. 
14 For example, H v H [2019] NZTT Christchurch 4168159. 
15 Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2020, s 39 (inserting s 56B–56E). 
16 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 61; for example, M v R [2019] NZTT Christchurch 4202652. 
17 R v D [2018] NZTT 4123920, where the female tenant, accompanied to the Tribunal by her partner, 
admitted to “losing her temper” and causing damage. The Tribunal concluded that equity favoured 
terminating the tenancy: 
It appears that there have been at least 3 occasions on which the police have been called. I accept that these 
incidents could have been such as to interfere with the reasonable peace and comfort of neighbours.  
W v E [2017] NZTT Manukau 4097768 (19 September 2017) included an application on the basis the ex-
partner coming over to the property and attacking the tenant was an interference with the peace and comfort 
of the neighbours. The adjudicator declined immediate termination as “to terminate the tenancy would be to 
revictimise [the tenant] and her son”. Instead, the application was adjourned for two months so the Tribunal 
can “re-evaluate the situation”, i.e., to see whether or not the ex-partner’s violent behaviour had ceased. See 
also Tara Vrettos "Victimizing the Victim: Evicting Domestic Violence Victims from Public Housing Based 
on the Zero-Tolerance Policy" (2002) 9(1) Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 97, discussing evictions of 
victims of domestic violence to protect the living environment of other tenants; and Matthew Desmond and 
Nicol Valdez "Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women" 
(2012) 78(1) American Sociological Review 117, discussing eviction of domestic violence victims for 
nuisance.  
18 For example, P v T [2020] NZTT Tokoroa 4251546. The provisions allowing termination for anti-social 
behaviour have been extended by the Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2020, s 38 (inserting s 55A). 
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The issue that is the focus of this article is the victim’s responsibility for damages and 
orders for termination of a tenancy where family violence has caused damage to a rented 
home. Family violence, as is well recognised in the literature and legislation, takes many 
forms.19 While early research on family violence focused on incidents of physical violence, 
it is now widely accepted that family violence is often a pattern of many behaviours to 
establish and maintain “coercive control”.20 These behaviours include psychological abuse, 
intimidation, sexual abuse, financial control, and physical violence (including against 
property, pets, loved ones and against the victim).21 Although the main concern of this 
paper is physical violence that results in damage to property, it needs to be kept in mind 
that this visible damage is likely to be just one manifestation of a broader pattern of 
behaviour. The physical damage to the rented home (unlike an owned home) creates a legal 
problem because it is a prima facie breach of the tenant’s obligation to not damage the 
premises.22 A breach of this obligation in turn gives rise to damages claims and can be the 
basis for a termination of the tenancy.23 Tenants may also flee the home, leaving behind 
furnishings and rubbish, also triggering liability for removal costs.24  
 
Women and children leaving their homes due to family violence has serious consequences, 
including an increased risk of homelessness. Australian research has shown that women 
who leave a tenancy due to family violence experience deterioration in housing conditions 
  
19 Ministry of Social Development Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2002) at 8; Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management 
Framework: A Common Approach to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk (New Zealand Government, 
2017) at 21–22; Emma Williamson "Living in the World of the Domestic Violence Perpetrator: Negotiating 
the Unreality of Coercive Control" (2010) 16 Violence Against Women 1412; Family Violence Act 2018, s 
9.  
20 Marilyn McMahon and Paul McGorrery (2020) “Criminalising Coercive Control: An Introduction” in 
Marilyn McMahon and Paul McGorrery (eds) Criminalising Coercive Control (Springer, Singapore, 2020) 
3.  
21 Evan Stark Coercive Control: the entrapment of women in personal life (Oxford University Press, Oxford; 
New York, 2007). 
22 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, ss 40 and 41.  
23 Residential Tenancies Act 1986. The legislation is discussed in detail in section III of this paper.  
24 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40. 
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(including affordability, tenure, condition, neighbourhood and safety).25 Furthermore, there 
are direct links between family violence and homelessness with women who leave home 
due to family violence being at serious social and financial disadvantage, meaning they 
cannot secure new housing.26 In New Zealand, a report on understanding women’s 
experience of homelessness in central Auckland set out “a typical housing journey” on the 
path to homelessness, which includes these steps:27   
 
 
The relationship between family violence and housing insecurity has also been recognised 
at the international level. The United Nations Human Rights Council’s Report on the 




25 Taryn Champion and others "The impact of housing on the lives of women and children – post domestic 
violence crisis accommodation" (study undertaken by the NSW Women Refuge Movement and the UWS 
Urban Research Centre, February 2009) . The United States literature similarly draws connections between 
family violence and homelessness; see for example Joan Collins, Renee Saris and Ingrid Johnston-Robledo 
"Low-income women speak out about housing: a high-stakes game of musical chairs" (2001) 57(2) Journal 
of Social Issues.  
26 Angela Spinney and Sarah Blandy "Homelessness Prevention for Women and Children who have 
experienced Domestic and Family Violence: Innovations in Policy and Practice" (Australian Housing and 
Urban Research Institute, June 2011) at 12–13. 
27 Lifewise "Mana Wahine: Building an understanding of women’s experience of homelessness in the 
Auckland City Centre" (Lifewise Trust, 2018) at 10. 
28 Dubravka Simonovic Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences UN Doc A/HRC/35/30 (13 June 2017) at 9. 
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The Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing as a component of the right 
to an adequate standard living, and on the right to non-discrimination of the 
Commission on Human Rights identified the relevance of the provision of shelters in 
the context of the right to adequate housing, and noted that domestic violence can 
greatly increase women’s vulnerability to homelessness, especially when there is a 
lack of protection by law enforcement officials, or by the legal system itself.  
 
New Zealand is attempting to tackle family violence, as well as its housing crisis, which 
has led to many New Zealanders experiencing insecure housing or homelessness.29 
Considering how these two policy areas intersect is therefore important; we can see where 
decisions being made can either support or undermine these policy efforts. 
 
II METHOD 
This article has its origins in observations of Tenancy Tribunal proceedings I undertook as 
part of a larger, multi-disciplinary project called “Eviction and its Consequences”.30 My 
contribution to that project was observational research of tenancy mediations and tribunal 
hearings. The Tenancy Tribunal is an adjudicative tribunal with jurisdiction over landlord-
tenant disputes for residential tenancies.31 When observing Tenancy Tribunal hearings, I 
took notes in both the waiting room and hearings of the interactions between adjudicators, 
landlords, tenants, property managers and court takers.32 I also examined the Tribunal 
orders related to the hearings I observed. I analysed this data using the qualitative software 
package NVivo, coding the data according to themes from the literature and identified 
within the data. For the purposes of this paper, I have drawn on data that I coded as it 
related to family violence.  
 
  
29 Alan Johnson, Philippa Howden-Chapman and Shamubeel Eaqub A Stocktake of New Zealand’s Housing 
(New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2018). 
30 This project is funded by the Marsden Foundation and is led by Professor Philippa Howden-Chapman.  
31 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 77.  
32 Ethical approval for that project was granted by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee, 
reference number 18/058. 
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Having undertaken this fieldwork, I examined the New Zealand legislation as it relates to 
damages and termination in residential tenancies. The issue of damages has been the 
subject of recent Court of Appeal authority and law reform,33 although not as it relates to 
family violence. I also searched the Tenancy Tribunal database of orders using the search 
terms “domestic violence”, “intimate partner violence”, “family violence”, “domestic 
abuse” and “interpersonal violence” to identify any cases where these terms are explicitly 
mentioned. I repeated the search in Westlaw and LexisNexis, which have limited sets of 
Tenancy Tribunal orders.  
 
I then reviewed the existing New Zealand and international literature (with a focus on 
Australia, Canada, England and the United States) on family violence and rented housing. 
There is a paucity of discussion on the topic in the New Zealand literature. This likely 
reflects a combination of factors: that the New Zealand legal academy is relatively small 
but must cover a wide range of topics; that the issue of damages from family violence lies 
at the intersection between criminal and property law and few scholars attend to both; and 
that the Tenancy Tribunal is a lawyer-less forum and, therefore, what occurs in that 
Tribunal is not well scrutinised. The international literature has more discussion, though 
not a great deal. Of course, it is specific to the legislative context of the country it concerns 
but it can provide some insight and inspiration for how we could reform our own law.  
A. Incidence 
The search method I used for the case databases resulted in a small set of orders that 
contained one of the search terms; 20 cases in a Tribunal that disposes of around 20,000 
cases per year.34 However, this likely greatly underestimates the number of cases where 
family violence has been the underlying cause of the damage. I observed 31 Tenancy 
Tribunal hearings as part of the research I conducted, and of those observations, family 
violence was explicitly discussed during the hearing in two (6 per cent). In both those cases, 
however, the order (which I retrieved after the observation) makes no mention of family 
  
33 Holler v Osaki [2016] NZCA 130, [2016] 2 NZLR 811; Residential Tenancies Amendment Act 2019 (No 
37); Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill 2020. 
34 Courts of New Zealand “Specialist Courts and Tribunals” <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>.  
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violence or any context that might indicate that the damage arose from a violent attack. 
One of these cases will serve as an example: During the hearing, the landlord told the 
adjudicator that the tenant, who did not attend the hearing, “left [the tenancy] as a result of 
domestic violence”. The application was for, amongst other things, damage to the house. 
Even though the adjudicator had been told there was family violence, he did not ask any 
questions about how the damage was caused or make any link to the possibility the damage 
was caused by family violence. The entire discussion about the damage follows: 
 
Adjudicator: so, let’s move to the damage. … There are three holes in that wall 
[referring to a photo] and in the other wall was a bigger one. 
 
Landlord: yes, that hole in the photo 59 probably needs Gib, it’s quite big, whereas the 
other ones could be patched up as they’re smaller.  
 
Adjudicator: yes, the other ones are smaller. Then painting interior door – living room 
– I can’t see it; can you point to one of the living room door?  
 
Landlord: I can’t find it either. I don’t usually do these applications. 
 
Adjudicator: there is a dent in this one – that is it – clearly a door. 
 
Landlord: yes, clearly a door – 4 holes in that. 
 
Adjudicator: now Mr [Landlord name], just dealing with that – none of these holes 
were there at the beginning of the tenancy and they happened during the tenancy. They 




The adjudicator then moved to another topic in the application. I asked the landlord, after 
the hearing, if he thought the holes were caused in the family violence incidents and he 




The order that was issued after this hearing makes no mention of the family violence but 
simply restates a paragraph that appears in over 2,000 orders currently on the Tenancy 
Tribunal database: 35 
 
Damage is intentional where a person intends to cause damage and takes the necessary 
steps to achieve that purpose. Damage is also intentional where a person does 
something, or allows a situation to continue, knowing that damage is a virtual certainty 
(Tekoa Trust v Stewart [2016] NZDC 25578). 
 
The tenant was ordered to pay over $500 for the holes that had been punched in the walls 
when the perpetrator had attacked.  
 
This suggests that family violence may be a factor in far more cases than is apparent from 
only reading the orders. Although we do not precisely know the magnitude of the issue, I 
have pursued it on the basis that it is important as a matter of principle, but also might be 
much more common that searching orders would lead us to believe.  
 
III STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The inquiry into the responsibility for damage caused by family violence must begin with 
the RTA, the legislation that governs residential landlord-tenant relationships. The RTA 
lays down a code – limited to residential landlord and tenant matters – over which the 
Tribunal has power to determine disputes.36  
A. Substantial Merits 
Section 85 of the RTA sets out the “manner in which jurisdiction is to be exercised”, and 
at s 85(2) states:  
 
  
35 The case citation has been updated to Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541 and instead of “a virtual certainty”, 
the wording is now “a certainty”.  
36 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, ss 4 and 5. 
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The Tribunal shall determine each dispute according to the general principles of the 
law relating to the matter and the substantial merits and justice of the case, but shall 
not be bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or 
technicalities. 
 
This section was recommended by the Property Law and Equity Reform Committee who 
did not think the Tribunal should have a “general power to act according to ‘equity and 
good conscience’” or to only have “regard to law”, as is the case with the Disputes 
Tribunal.37 However, it did agree that: 38 
 
… strict adherence to precedent and legal logic is not always appropriate, and we 
would have no difficulty with a provision empowering the Tribunal to deal with the 
substantial justice of the case before it, having regard to law but without being bound 
to give effect to strict rights or obligations or legal forms or technicalities. 
 
In keeping with this original intent, the High Court has found that s 85(2) does not empower 
the Tribunal to make a determination unless there is a claim against a tenant or landlord 
according to general principles of law.39 If a tenant had no claim against the landlord at 
law, s 85 cannot create a claim. However, if there is a claim against a tenant or landlord in 
accordance with general principles of law, “then the Tenancy Tribunal must take into 
account the substantial merits and justice of the case”.40 The approach is conjunctive: the 
decision must be in accordance with the general principle of law and the substantial merits. 
As the High Court said in a later case, “Section 85(2) does not … give the Tribunal a carte 
blanche to decide the case on its perception of merits and justice. However, it can be an aid 
  
37 Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Report on Residential Tenancies (Wellington, May 1985) at 
[23]. Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, s 18(6): “The Tribunal shall determine the dispute according to the 
substantial merits and justice of the case, and in doing so shall have regard to the law but shall not be bound 
to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations or to legal forms or technicalities”.  
38 Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Report on Residential Tenancies (Wellington, May 1985) at  
[23].  
39 Welsh v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington AP35/2000, 9 March 2001.  
40 Welsh v Housing New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington AP35/2000, 9 March 2001 (emphasis added).  
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to interpretation”.41 With this general principle in mind, I now turn to the specific 
provisions relating to liability for damage. 
B. Liability for Damage 
Section 40(2) of the RTA sets out the actions of a tenant that are prohibited, including that 
the tenant shall not “intentionally or carelessly damage, or permit any other person to 
damage, the premises”.42 Under the heading “Responsibility for damage”, s 49A sets out 
the general principle that tenants have no liability or obligation to make good the cost of 
any damage to premises. Section 49B gives the exceptions to that general principle. The 
exceptions in s 49B(1) include that a tenant is not excused from liability where:43  
 
a) the … damage was intentionally done or caused by the tenant or by a person for 
whose actions the tenant is responsible for under section 41 … ; or 
b) the … damage was the result of an act or omission by the tenant or by a person for 
whose actions the tenant is responsible under section 41 … and the act or omission 
occurred on or about the premises and constitutes an imprisonable offence. 
 
Section 41 addresses the “Tenant’s responsibility for actions of others”. Tenants are 
responsible for the actions of anyone at the premises with their permission, and anyone at 
the premises is presumed to be there with the tenant’s permission unless the tenant can 
prove otherwise:44  
 
  
41 Ziki Investments (Properties) Ltd v McDonald [2008] 3 NZLR 417 (HC). See also Housing New Zealand 
Corporation v Davis HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-3766, 7 November 2011.  
42 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40(2)(a). 
43 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 49B(1)(a) and (b). These sections were inserted by the Residential 
Tenancies Amendment Act 2019 in the wake of the Court of Appeal case of Holler v Osaki [2016] NZCA 
130, [2016] 2 NZLR 811, because before the amendment, there were tensions between responsibility for 
unintentional damage as laid out in the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 and as stated in the Property Law Act 
2007. The 2019 amendments leave the liability for intentional damage largely unchanged. The only 
amendment of substance – which is significant for our purposes – is that the tenant also has liability for an 
act or omission that constitutes an imprisonable offence, as well as for anything intentionally done. 
44 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 41(2). 
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… it shall be presumed that the tenant permitted that person to be in the premises 
unless the tenant proves that he or she took all reasonable steps to prevent that person 
from entering the premises or (as the case may require) to eject that person from the 
premises. 
 
The Tribunal has the power to order a tenant who has breached the obligations in s 40(2) 
to pay “such sum by way of damages or compensation as the Tribunal shall assess”.45 If 
the damage to the property is “substantial”, then the Tribunal must terminate the tenancy.44 
The only way to avoid a termination is to satisfy the Tribunal that the damage has been 
remedied and the landlord compensated for any loss arising, and it is unlikely that a further 
breach (non-payment of rent or damage) will occur again.45 
C. Unlawful Acts 
In addition to the obligation on tenants not to damage the premises, s 40(2) states that 
tenants “shall not use the premises, or permit the premises to be used, for any unlawful 
purpose”.46 Contravening this subsection is declared to be an “unlawful act”.47 Where the 
Tribunal finds that premises have been used or permitted to be used for an unlawful 
purpose, it can award exemplary damages against the responsible tenant of up to $1,000.48 
D. Interpreting the statutory scheme 
The wording of the statute as it relates to intentional damage leaves open several questions 
of interpretation that have been subject to appellate authority. The first is, what constitutes 
“intentional damage” in the RTA? This issue has been considered by the District Court and 
High Court in cases sharing similar facts – a tenant allowing a dog to enter on to the 
premises and continuing to let it enter after it had urinated on the carpet.49 In Tekoa Trust 
  
45 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 77(2)(n). 
44 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 55(1)(b). 
45 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 55(2). 
46 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40(2)(c). 
47 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40(3A)(c).  
48 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s109(1) and Schedule 1A.  
49 Tekoa Trust v Stewart [2016] NZDC 25578; Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541. 
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v Stewart, Judge Smith quoted from Brookers Summary Offences commentary on s 11 of 
the Summary Offences Act 1981:50  
 
Conduct will be intentional when it is deliberate, and not accidental, and the [resulting 
damage] … will be intentional if the defendant meant to cause it or (probably) knew 
that it was virtually certain to result.  
 
Where damage is caused by family violence, it is unlikely that questions would be raised 
about intent. The act of punching a wall, for example, is certainly deliberate, not accidental, 
and the damage is virtually certain to result.51 As long as the tenant has permitted the person 
punching the wall to be at the premises, the tenant is liable for their acts.  
 
This brings us to a further point of interpretation that arises from the statutory language – 
the meaning of “permit”. This is used in ss 40 and 41 to impose liability on the tenant when 
they “permit” an action by another or where the tenant is presumed to have “permitted” 
someone to be at the property unless the tenant rebuts that presumption. The District Court 
considered the meaning of “permit” as it is used in s 40 of the RTA and held that it should 
be given its extended meaning of not only directly giving permission but also “turning a 




50 Tekoa Trust v Stewart [2016] NZDC 25578 at [15]. Judge Smith was considering the Property Law Act 
2007, s 269(3)(a). The Court of Appeal clarified in Holler v Osaki that ss 268 and 269 apply to residential 
tenancies. 
51 It is possible an argument could be run that the perpetrator had intended to hit the victim, missed and 
punched the wall and it was, therefore, accidental damage. In practice, this is an unlikely argument and I have 
not found any cases where it has been mounted. 
52 Housing New Zealand Corporation v Salt DC Auckland CIV-2007-004-2875, 12 September 2008 at [31], 




Where someone has damaged the property who is not permitted to be there, then the tenant 
has no liability. For example, in Keenan v Mottram, damage to a ranch slider that occurred 
as the result of a burglary was not the tenant’s responsibility:53  
 
… a tenant's liability for damage only extends to his own acts or omissions or those of 
others on the premises with his permission (s 41(1)). In the absence of evidence of 
negligence on the part of the tenant with respect to security matters, a tenant is 
certainly not responsible for damage caused by a burglar.  
 
In such a situation, the landlord would have a claim against the burglar (although a difficult 
one to mount in practice), but would otherwise be responsible for repairing the damage. 
Intentional damage, whether by a stranger, a tenant or a tenant’s guests, is an insurable risk. 
 
 
IV INTENTIONAL DAMAGE PROVISIONS APPLIED TO FAMILY VIOLENCE – SOLE 
TENANT 
Having reviewed the statutory framework, I now turn to how this has been applied in cases 
of family violence where the victim is the sole tenant. I will be reviewing the Tribunal 
orders with a critical lens, examining the application of RTA in light of the lived experience 
of family violence. 
 
A. Erasure 
As discussed in the methods section above, in an unknown number of cases, the family 
violence context is completely omitted. This occurred in two of the 31 cases I observed. 
The erasure of context is not unique to the Tenancy Tribunal, but is a way in which the 
legal process misses or minimises women’s experience of the law. As observed in 
discussing the Feminist Judgments Project Aotearoa:54 
  
53 Keenan v Mottram TT 96/87, 13 February 1989, Rossiter Adjudicator. 
54 Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach 




The way in which a judge tells the story that led to a court case has the effect of 
solidifying the particular narrative adopted by the judge. If the judge ignores certain 
details deemed to be legally irrelevant, those details are lost from the story. The way 
in which a judge constructs and interprets the facts of a case becomes a legal ‘truth’.  
 
Failing to mention violence in Tribunal orders does not mean it has not occurred, but 
constructs a legal realm where this information is irrelevant. Damage caused by a violent 
partner simply becomes intentional damage of the tenant. The standard paragraph on 
intentional damage (based on Tekoa) is recited and the tenant is held to be liable.  
B. Family violence – a Mention 
Where the context of family violence is mentioned, it is often presented as only that – a 
mention. It is simply noted as the mechanism of damage and no further comment is made 
about it. For example:55  
 
The tenant accepted responsibility for a missing door [$345] and curtain rail [$115] 
and for some damage to walls [unspecified portion of $230]. She explained that she 
was the victim of domestic violence and it was her partner who deliberately caused 
the damage.  
 
There is no discussion about s 41 and whether efforts were made to exclude or eject the 
partner as required by s 41(2). In another case, there is a more graphic description:56 
 
[13] The following damage was caused during the tenancy: lounge door frame 
smashed, window pane in conservatory smashed [$302.61], and master bedroom door 
damaged and removed [unspecified portion of $501.77]. The damage is more than fair 
wear and tear. 
[14] I find the damage to be intentional due to the nature of it. It appears from the 
evidence provided that significant force had to be applied to cause the damage. There 
  
55 F & E v S [2019] NZTT Christchurch 4171542 at [18]. 
56 R v K [2019] NZTT Rotorua 4186803. 
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is also a backdrop of domestic violence consistent with the blood found smeared on 
walls and inside a bedroom wardrobe cupboard.  
 
While some readers might – should – find this recitation chilling, the context serves only 
as a backdrop. It has no legal effect as there is no discussion of the statutory provisions 
where it might have relevance: the rebuttable presumption that the person carrying out the 
damage is there with the tenant’s permission (s 41(2)) and the substantive merits (s 85).  
 
In C v J, the sole tenant was found liable for damages to windows ($516.35). The order 
records that: “The damage to the windows and doors was admitted to be due to domestic 
violence with her partner trying to gain access by jimmying the locks”.57 The victim-tenant 
had taken steps to exclude the partner – this can be inferred by the fact that the damage was 
caused by him jimmying the locks to gain entry. Instead of focusing on this, however, the 
order simply records that the tenant “admitted” that is how the damage occurred and is held 
liable. This is in contrast to the order in Keenan v Mottram (the case that involved a 
burglary by a stranger, mentioned above), where the adjudicator noted that unless the tenant 
has been negligent, “a tenant is certainly not responsible for damage caused by a burglar”.58 
C. Reasonable Steps to Prevent Entry or to Eject 
There are some cases that do engage with a discussion of s 41 (although none with s 85), 
with varying results. The most victim-friendly interpretation of s 41(2) is found in the 1996 
case of Housing New Zealand v McKelvey:59  
 
[The hole in the wall] was done by her ex-partner when he was at the house and 
became very angry. The police were called. The Residential Tenancies Act states in s 
41(2) that where any other person intentionally or carelessly damages the premises the 
tenant shall be presumed to have permitted that person to be in the premises unless the 
tenant proves that she took all reasonable steps to [in this case] eject that person from 
the premises. The Tribunal holds that, in the situation where someone is violent and is 
  
57 C v J [2018] NZTT Hamilton 4121356 at [5]. 
58 Keenan v Mottram TT 96/87, 13 February 1989, Rossiter Adjudicator. 
59 Housing New Zealand v McKelvey TT Palmerston North TT268/96, 11 April 1996 at 2.  
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damaging the premises, calling the police is making a reasonable attempt to protect 
both the occupants and the premises. Ms McKelvey did this. The liability for the repair 
and re-decoration of the wall lies with the person who did the damage. 
 
McKelvey is cited in the 2018 textbook by Stewart Benson, a current Tenancy Adjudicator, 
to stand for the proposition that: “[a] tenant takes reasonable steps to eject a person who 
caused damage by calling the Police to remove that person”.60 As it is a Tribunal order, it 
is not a binding precedent and other orders show inconsistency in approach.  
 
In a more recent case, the tenant’s family had called the police when her ex-partner forced 
his way into the premises, punched holes in the doors and pushed the tenant onto a table.61 
It was not the call to the police that was relied on, however, but a statutory declaration from 
the ex-partner rebutting the presumption by admitting he had forced entry: “In the 
declaration [the ex-partner] admits that he forced his way into the house and caused the 
damage and that [the tenant] had no control over his actions.”62 This is unusually thorough 
evidence. Producing a statutory declaration requires the tenant to know about this type of 
evidence, or have an advisor who does, and to have the cooperation of her ex-partner. It 
can be assumed this would rarely be evidence that could be produced.  
 
In other cases, there are indications that something approaching this high evidentiary bar 
is necessary to rebut the presumption. In D v T, the order records that the police were called 
to the property during at least one incident, but the adjudicator found the tenant responsible 
because she did not take out a trespass order:63 
 
[The tenant] did not contest the damage to the walls done by her ex-partner [$250] … 
[The tenant] told me at the first hearing she did not trespass her ex-boyfriend from the 
premises. He was therefore in the premises with her consent and she is liable for the 
cost of the damage. 
  
60 Stewart Benson Residental Tenancy Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [6.14]. 
61 W v E [2017] NZTT Manukau 4097768. 
62 W v E [2017] NZTT Manukau 4097768 at [3]. 




In J v L, the adjudicator accepted the evidence of the tenant that damage to three walls “was 
intentionally caused by her ex-partner in a domestic violence incident” but went on to 
state:64 
 
The tenant was unable to provide any evidence that that she took all reasonable steps 
to prevent that person from entering the premises or to eject that person from the 
premises (see section 41(2) RTA) therefore she has not disproved liability for the 
damage. 
 
It does not explain what steps she did take, so we cannot independently evaluate the 
reasonableness of those steps. She was found liable for the $112.12 to repair the holes.  
 
These cases suggest an inconsistent and unclear approach to the evidence required to rebut 
the presumption that the tenant permitted the person who damaged the premises to be on 
the premises. In these cases, the tenant appeared and produced some evidence, but what 
happens when a tenant does not attend the hearing?  
D. Not There to Give Evidence 
It is common for tenants not to appear in the Tribunal.65 This creates a difficulty if the 
tenant is not available to rebut the presumption created by s 41(2). How this plays out in 
family violence cases is illustrated by two cases where the state housing provider, Housing 
New Zealand (now Kāinga Ora) was the landlord claiming against a victim of family 
violence.  
 
In Housing New Zealand v K, Housing New Zealand waived its entitlement to 21 days’ 
notice because it was satisfied that the tenant “needed to urgently vacate the property out 
of fear for her safety”. Despite this, it went on to claim $1,515.79 to repair damage:66 
 
  
64 J v L [2019] NZTT Rotorua 4199813 at [11]. 
65 In the set of cases examined for this article, tenants attended the hearing in only eight of the cases. 
66 Housing New Zealand v K [2019] NZTT Palmerston North 4187129 at [11].  
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As noted, the tenant left with some urgency our of fears for her personal safety. Those 
fears are consistent with the pattern of damage to the premises shown in the 
photographic evidence. Those photographs show significant damage including 
smashed doors (during as well as at the end of the tenancy), a large number of holes 
and indentations in doors and wall surfaces that appear to be intentional and which 
suggest that serious family violence may have occurred in the home. 
 
The adjudicator went on to recite s 41 and the presumption created by s 41(2). In an unusual 
acknowledgment of the operation of the RTA in the family violence context, the 
adjudicator noted that:67  
[I]t is distressing to consider that tenants who are victims of family violence may be 
further victimised, by having to pay for the costs of repairing damage to the premises 
when that damage was caused in the course of abuse inflicted on them. 
Despite finding that there was family violence, that the damage was consistent with being 
caused by family violence and that the tenant was the victim of that violence, the 
adjudicator said:68 
 
the tenant has not appeared today to give evidence about how the damage occurred or 
the surrounding circumstances. That being so there is no basis on which the Tribunal 
can presume anything other than what s 41(2) requires it to presume. 
 
The same reasoning appears in Housing New Zealand Corporation v T, which involved a 
smaller sum ($76.50) for repainting interior doors.69 The adjudicator noted that “[t]he 
nature of the damage and the reasons given by the tenant for terminating the tenancy lead 
to the inference that the damage may have been caused in the course of family violence to 
which the tenant was subjected” but as the “tenant can give the relevant evidence” to rebut 
the s 41(2) presumption and she did not attend, the damages were awarded against her.70  
  
67 Housing New Zealand v K [2019] NZTT Palmerston North 4187129 at [13]. 
68 Housing New Zealand v K [2019] NZTT Palmerston North 4187129 at [14]. 
69 Housing New Zealand Corporation v T [2019] NZTT Gisborne 4191062. 
70 Housing New Zealand Corporation v T [2019] NZTT Gisborne 4191062 at [14]–[16].  
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E. The Problems with the Current Approach – Contextual Reading Required 
This interpretation seems to require that even if there is evidence of family violence and 
the landlord accepts that, it is the tenant who must present evidence to rebut the 
presumption. This means that the victim of family violence, who has fled a house for her 
own safety, must attend a hearing in person (where it is a matter of public record that she 
is the respondent), and give evidence that she “took all reasonable steps to prevent that 
person from entering the premises or (as the case may require) to eject that person from the 
premises”. If she does not do this, she is liable for damages.  
 
This sets up a very significant evidentiary hurdle for victims of family violence, who might 
face additional barriers to attendance due to relocation or keeping their whereabouts 
private. It also seems at odds with the very flexible evidentiary requirements that are built 
into the Tribunal procedure which allow the Tribunal to:71 
… call for and receive as evidence any statement, document, information, matter, or 
thing that in its opinion may assist it to deal effectually with the matters before it, 
whether or not the same would be admissible in a court of law. 
 
It also arguably contravenes s 85(2) as it is giving strict effect to legal forms or 
technicalities when the substantive justice requires a less strict approach. The Tribunal has 
used s 85(2) to benefit landlords by making tenants liable for compensating the landlord's 
loss, even though the law said they were not responsible.72 Why not use it to protect tenants 
from liability when they are the victims of family violence? Either taking a flexible 
approach to evidence or exercising its inquisitorial powers could remedy this situation and 
give effect to s 85. Furthermore, the Tribunal has existing powers to call more evidence if 
requested. Section 99 confers the power to require a Tenancy Mediator or suitable person 
to “to inquire into, and report in writing to the Tribunal upon, any matter of fact having a 
bearing upon the proceedings”, rather than leaving the liability to reside with a tenant who 
may have been unable to attend.  
 
  
71 Residential Tenancy Act 1986, s 97(4). 
72 Mark Bennett "Problems in Residential Tenancy Law Revealed by Holler v Osaki" (2017) 17 VUWLR 
497 at 516–517. 
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In addition to the evidentiary problem, the interpretation of s 41(2) is problematic in a more 
fundamental way. The inference of finding that the tenant, during a family violence attack, 
has not taken “reasonable steps to prevent that person from entering … or … to eject the 
person” is that she ought to have done more to keep herself (and the property) safe. The 
implication is that she is somewhat responsible for what is happening in that she did not 
just draw the line and not let him into the property in the first place or eject him when he 
turned violent. This establishes a very difficult hurdle for victims of family violence who 
are conceived, in this interpretation, as being in control of the conduct of their partner or 
ex-partner. This is at odds with the reality of family violence, as Tara Vrettos observes:73 
 
It is … utterly impossible for battered women to control the conduct of their abusive 
partners for the purpose of compliance with lease provisions. To control is to “exercise 
restraining or directing influence over; to have power over”. In abusive relationships, 
the violent partner maintains all the control, not the victim. 
 
A helpful analogy might be to think of a home invasion. Imagine that a 70-year-old woman 
living in a rented home permitted the entry of a man because he was posing as a workman. 
After he was permitted to enter, he attacked the woman and damaged the property in the 
process. Would the landlord apply for damages? Would the Tribunal consider the tenant 
responsible?  
 
Section 41(2) says that to rebut the presumption that she permitted him to be there and is 
therefore responsible for the damage, she must show she took all reasonable steps to eject 
him. It seems highly unlikely this would be read as her having to muscle him out of the 
house, as the term “eject” evokes. Her need to take life-preserving measures such as 
sheltering, running away or attempting de-escalation would all be reasonable. Preserving 
her safety must come ahead of protecting the landlord’s property. It seems unlikely an 
adjudicator would, in this situation, require her to call the police while he was still at the 
premises. Indeed, if she was too frightened to call the police after the attack and was found 
  
73 Tara Vrettos "Victimizing the Victim: Evicting Domestic Violence Victims from Public Housing Based 
on the Zero-Tolerance Policy" (2002) 9 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 97 at 119. 
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instead by a neighbour who called the police, it seems highly unlikely this would be 
considered insufficient to rebut the presumption. To say otherwise would be to suggest that 
by letting someone into the house and then doing what she can to protect herself, she has 
permitted everything that followed. This imports a sense of blame that is unconscionable 
on the facts. The section instead needs to be read in the context of a violent attack, 
recognising that reasonable steps may include minimal or no steps.  
 
If we apply the same reasoning to the family violence context, we can see that reasonable 
steps to eject might be very limited. If a victim is being attacked, calling the police might 
be a reasonable step, and any police callouts – evidence of which could come from any 
source – should be sufficient. However, when under attack, no or limited steps to eject 
might also be reasonable. Once an attack has been established, more stringent evidence of 
positive steps imports a sense of blame; people can be assumed to be doing their best to 
keep themselves safe within the context that they are presented with.  
 
But what if she let him into the house knowing that he had attacked her in the past and, 
therefore, might again? Would this make her responsible in a way that the 70-year-old 
woman is not? This reasoning is uncomfortably close to the intentional damage cases where 
the tenant was liable because they let a dog into the house knowing it had urinated on the 
carpet previously and, therefore, might again.74 We do not need go down this path of 
reasoning, however, when we view family violence not as “incident based” but as coercive 
control.  
 
Through the lens of coercive control, we can recognise that what appears a voluntary 
decision to let him in the door, knowing he might attack, might actually involve very little 
“choice”. Attempting to prevent entry and calling the police, either before or after he enters 
  
74 Guo v Korck [2019] NZHC 1541; Tekoa Trust v Stewart [2016] NZDC 25578. 
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the property, may be very dangerous for the victim.75 Over time, the victim may be less 
likely to call the police or take other steps because:76 
The outcome of being coerced through exposure to repeated acts of violence is 
inevitably the diminishment of possibilities for action: because one fears the 
repercussions that will follow from taking such actions. 
 The victim cannot be cast as willingly permitting the perpetrator to enter, in the knowledge 
they are likely to attack them, because again it casts the victim as consenting to the violence 
or at least sharing some responsibility for it.  
 
What constitutes reasonable steps to prevent entry and eject the perpetrator must be 
sensitive to both the physical characteristics of the tenant and the context of family violence 
generally. The statute seems to contemplate that preventing entry by force and ejection by 
force might be reasonable in some circumstances. We would not expect that of any tenant 
who is physically smaller or weaker than the person damaging the property. Similarly, we 
cannot expect a tenant who is subject to coercive control to prevent the entry of or eject the 
abuser, even if she is physically capable of doing so. An interpretation of s 41(2) that is 
attentive to this context operates more fairly – meeting the requirements of s 85 – than the 
current mechanistic approach which, while appearing neutral on its face, is biased against 
abused women tenants. 
 
V INTENTIONAL DAMAGE PROVISIONS APPLIED TO FAMILY VIOLENCE – CO-
TENANTS 
The cases considered so far have concerned a victim who is a sole tenant. There are other 
cases, however, where the victim is a co-tenant with the perpetrator. Co-tenants are jointly 
and severally liable for breaches of tenant obligations.77 Joint and several liability can 
  
75 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 
2001) at [26] and also at [45]: “The very act of seeking help from others may escalate the violence”.  
76 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 
2001) at [15]. 
77 Harrison v Shields & Ors DC Dunedin NP 435-00, 25 September 2002, Judge GS MacAskill as noted by 
David Grinlinton “Landlord and Tenant” (2003) 10 BCB 128. See also the commentary [RT40.03] on “joint 
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produce unjust results in a number of tenancy contexts, but in this section, I consider its 
effect in holding victims and perpetrators equally responsible for damage caused by family 
violence.  
A. Joint and Several Liability for Victim and Perpetrator 
In Housing New Zealand v H & W,78 the female tenant appeared at the hearing but the male 
tenant did not. She had left the premises because of family violence but she was still named 
as a tenant so was found jointly and severally liable for damages, rubbish removal and 
cleaning amounting to $3,187.98. The bond of $322 was deducted from this sum and she 
and her ex-partner were liable to pay $20 per week until the debt was paid, i.e. $20 per 
week for 143 weeks which amounted to more than two and a half years of payments. If any 
of the 143 payments was late by more than two working days, then the whole balance of 
the debt would become immediately due and payable. The adjudicator noted that though 
the order “might feel to her like compounding the abuse, tenants are liable for the actions 
of people at the premises with their permission”. Despite the observation that the order 
might compound the abuse of the victim, the adjudicator did not mention s 85 of the RTA.  
 
In other co-tenant cases, the fact that the damage is intentional has been evidenced by police 
callouts for family violence. In M & T v W & W, broken glass in windows and doors 
($560.76) was recorded as intentional damage: “The evidence from the landlord today was 
that there have been Police visits to the property and domestic violence issues”.79 Similarly, 
in RW v M & P, the tenants were ordered to pay $413 for reglazing on the basis that 
intention could be inferred from “police callouts to the premises in connection with family 
violence incidents”.80 
 
Joint and several liability makes both victim and perpetrator equally responsible for the 
damage, again importing the idea that a victim carries blame for family violence. 
  
and several liability” in Tom Bennion and others Land Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019) 
citing Nella Ltd v Kirker TT Greymouth 10/111/GM, 4 April 2011 for the same proposition.  
78 Housing New Zealand v H and W [2018] NZTT Gisborne 4142145. 
79 M & T v W & W [2019] NZTT Manukau 4205749 at [5]. 
80 RW v M & P [2017] NZTT Whanganui 4107647 at [9]. 
27  
 
Furthermore, using police callouts as evidence of intentional damage creates a disincentive 
for the victim to engage the assistance of the police.  
B. Reading Down or Reform 
It would be possible to read s 85 as providing the justification to read down the application 
of joint and several liability in this context. Judge MacAskill in Harrison v Shields & Ors 
arrived at the conclusion that tenants were jointly and severally liable under ss 40 and 41 
of the RTA by drawing on several factors.81 This included the wording of the lease itself,82 
applying the common law principle of joint and several liability and taking the view that s 
67 of the Property Law Act 1952 (now s 276 of the Property Law Act 2007) applies. Section 
276 says that: 
 
A covenant made by 2 or more covenantors binds both or all the covenantors jointly 
and severally, unless a contrary intention appears in the instrument or in the short-term 
lease not made in writing.  
 
The Judge acknowledged that ss 40 and 41 were statutory obligations, not covenants, but 
said the content of the statutory obligations was sufficiently similar to infer the application 
of the section.83 Given the patchwork of interpretation undertaken to get to the view that s 
40 and 41 apply jointly and severally, it is possible that, by taking into account s 85, limits 
to the application of joint and several liability could be applied.  
 
  
81 Harrison v Shields & Ors DC Dunedin NP 435-00, 25 September 2002, Judge GS MacAskill as noted by 
David Grinlinton “Landlord and Tenant” (2003) 10 BCB 128. 
82 Unlike the lease in Harrison v Shields, which said the tenants were “jointly and severally liable for debts 
arising from this tenancy”, the current version of the Residential Tenancy Agreement published on 
<www.tenancy.govt.nz> does not contain any mention of joint and several liability in the agreement itself. 
In the insurance statement attached, under the heading “Law changes relating to insurance and damage”, it 
says: “Tenants will be liable for the full cost of damage that they or their guests cause intentionally or that 
results from an act or omission that constitutes an imprisonable offence”, but this is only a restatement of the 
law as it is currently understood (as at 25 June 2020). 
83 Harrison v Shields & Ors DC Dunedin NP 435-00, 25 September 2002, Judge GS MacAskill as noted by 
David Grinlinton “Landlord and Tenant” (2003) 10 BCB 128. 
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C. Exemplary Damages Against Co-tenants 
While the current interpretation of joint and several liability for tenant and perpetrator co-
tenants compounds the abuse of the victim, there is also an example of the Tribunal causing 
even more harm to the victim by making an order for exemplary damages against victim 
and perpetrator co-tenants. The RTA includes provision for the award of exemplary 
damages in certain situations, including where the tenant uses the premises or permits the 
premise to be used for any unlawful purpose.84 This provision was used in P v M & G to 
seek exemplary damages “on the basis that there was domestic violence [the unlawful 
purpose] at the property during the tenancy”.85 The evidence produced in support of this 
was 16 callouts to police, “13 of which relate to domestic disputes or assault”.86 Damages 
were awarded to repair 28 holes in the walls “which appear to be the result of punches” 
($2,100), three smashed panes in a ranch slider ($750) and a broken window ($200). The 
adjudicator went on to find that there were “multiple incidents of domestic violence at the 
property” and an award of $500 in exemplary damages was warranted:87 
 
I accept Mr [Landlord]’s argument that a claim for exemplary damages for unlawful 
activity of this type is analogous to a claim for exemplary damages for the unlawful 
activity of methamphetamine use at a property. The relevant considerations are the 
risk of physical damage to the property itself, disruption and loss of security for 
neighbours, and reputational risk for the property.  
 
The order in P v M & G makes no reference to s 109(3) of the RTA, which sets out the 
matters that the Tribunal is to have regard to in determining whether to award exemplary 
damages against someone who has committed an unlawful act. The Tribunal must be 
satisfied that “it would be just to require the person against whom the order is sought”, 
having regard to the intent of the perpetrator, the effect of the act, “the interests of the 
landlord or the tenant against whom the unlawful act was committed” and the public 
  
84 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 40(2)(b). A breach of this provision allows for an award of exemplary 
damages of up to a maximum of $1,000 (ss 40(3A)(b), 109(3) and Schedule 1A).  
85 P v M & G [2019] NZTT Kaikohe 4202366 at [20]. 
86 P v M & G [2019] NZTT Kaikohe 4202366 at [10]–[11]. 
87 P v M & G [2019] NZTT Kaikohe 4202366 at [23]–[24]. 
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interest. David Grinlinton suggests that the guidance in Auckland City Council v Blundell88 
is “useful for a Tribunal considering a claim for exemplary damages under the Act”.89 He 
sets out the relevant paragraph from that judgment: 
 
Exemplary and punitive are different words for the same thing. The damages are 
exemplary because they are meant to teach an example to the guilty officer and others. 
They are punitive because they are meant to punish. They are like a fine, though they 
go to the citizen who has been the victim of the conduct.  
 
It follows that damages of this sort can only be given if the jury are satisfied that there 
was something outrageous in the conduct … which deserves to be punished.  
 
The adjudicator in P v M & G does not consider whether the conduct is so outrageous that 
it should be punished. No mention is made of the public interest. There is no consideration 
of the significant differences between a tenant manufacturing methamphetamine and one 
tenant assaulting another, nor an acknowledgement that in punishing the perpetrator, the 
victim is punished as well. This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court determined in 
Couch (No 2) that vicarious liability for compensatory damages does not mean that a person 
is vicariously liable for exemplary damages unless “their conduct itself also qualifies for 
punishment”: “People should not be vicariously liable for punishment on account of the 
conduct of someone else just because that conduct renders them liable to compensate the 
plaintiff”.90  
 
Furthermore, the order in P v M & G does not record any consideration of whether, on 
balance, it would be “just” to require the perpetrator and victim to be jointly and severally 
liable for an order intended to punish, as required by s 85. While compensatory damages 
  
88 Auckland City Council v Blundell [1986] 1 NZLR 732 (CA) at 740.  
89 David Grinlinton Residential Tenancies: The Law and Practice (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2012) at 
[8.4.2]. 
90 Couch v Attorney General [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149 at [158] per Tipping J. See also S v 
Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR 450 (CA) at [88] that it is not proper to impose vicarious liability for 
exemplary damages on a party “who has not been complicit in the wrongdoing” as “[a]ny ‘message of 
disapproval’ would be delivered to the wrong person”. 
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against victims of family violence blames the victim for the damage, exemplary damages 
takes that one step further and punishes the victim for being a victim.  
 
 
VI DISCUSSION – THE LARGER CONTEXT 
Damage that occurs through family violence to a tenanted property is treated as a private 
incident where the responsibility lies with the contracting party, regardless of whether that 
party is a victim of the violence. The RTA needs to be seen, however, as a law that is 
adjacent to the core law preventing family violence and that, therefore, has an important 
role to play in the response. If instead the tenancy laws are “written, interpreted, and 
implemented [in a way that] can harm women, lead to suffering in their lives, and even to 
their deaths .... they constitute a form of violence, legal violence”. 91 It is, therefore, 
important to situate the drafting and interpretation of the RTA in the wider policy context.  
A. A Co-ordinated State Response 
The New Zealand Government operates a “Family Violence Risk Assessment Management 
Framework” aimed at coordinating the responses of generalist, specialist and statutory 
service providers because “the lack of consistency contributes to poor and unsafe responses 
in New Zealand”.92 The Government strategy recognises that:93 
 
Family violence is a harsh reality for many New Zealanders – we have some of the 
highest rates in the developed world. The government is committed to reducing family 
violence, keeping victims safe, and managing perpetrators more effectively so all New 
Zealanders can live free from violence.  
 
  
91 Erin Adamson, Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh "The Impact of Adjacent Laws on 
Implementing Violence Against Women Laws: Legal Violence in the Lives of Costa Rican Women" (2020) 
45(2) Law and Social Inquiry 432 at 446 citing previous work by Menjívar and colleagues.  
92 Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach 
to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk (New Zealand Government, 2017) at 18. 
93 Ministry of Justice Family Violence Risk Assessment and Management Framework: A Common Approach 
to Screening, Assessing and Managing Risk (New Zealand Government, 2017) at 1. 
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One of the statutory service providers covered by this policy is the New Zealand Police. 
The Police state that:94 
… reducing the number and impact of family harm episodes is a key Police strategy. 
Police take every opportunity to prevent harm and reduce offending and victimisation. 
… Always call the Police if you think someone is in danger 
As we have seen, however, evidence of police visits for family violence is sometimes being 
used as evidence that the damage is intentional so that the tenant-victim can be found liable. 
This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact it can be very difficult for family violence 
victims to seek the help of the police, as it may increase the danger they face from the 
perpetrator.95  
 
Social housing also plays an important role. Kāinga Ora is an independent Crown agency 
whose functions include providing rental accommodation “principally for those who need 
it most”.96 Its objective is to:97  
… contribute to sustainable, inclusive, and thriving communities that … provide 
people with good quality, affordable housing choices that meet diverse needs; and … 
sustain or enhance the overall economic, social, environmental, and cultural well-
being of current and future generations. 
In four of the 20 cases identified in the database searches, Housing New Zealand (now 
Kāinga Ora) was the landlord claiming against a victim of family violence. To pursue 
family violence victims for damage to a home they have lived in – and then fled – seems 
contrary to this objective and to undermine the state’s coordinated response to lowering 
rates of family violence, as well as preventing homelessness.98  
 
The problem of homelessness can be exacerbated by damages awards against tenant-
victims. Women who leave their homes to escape violence but who are faced with damages 
  
94 New Zealand Police “Help for family violence” (2020)  <www.police.govt.nz>. 
95 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 
2001) at [43]; some victims of family violence “fear, with good cause, that they will be killed or seriously 
beaten if they go to the police for protection or seek to leave the abusive relationship”.  
96 Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities Act 2019, s 13(1)(a).  
97 Kāinga Ora – Homes and Communities Act 2019, s 12. 
98 See also Victorian Ombudsman Investigation into the management of maintenance claims against public 
housing tenants (Victorian Ombudsman, October 2017) in which the public housing agency in Victoria, 
Australia, came under criticism for the practice of claiming against victims of family violence. 
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awards may struggle to find new housing.99 Any damages award is first deducted from the 
bond, meaning that to find a new home, they must save a bond for another property. This 
can lead to the spiral towards homelessness referred to in the Australian literature.100 To 
escape homelessness, they may need to turn back to the violent partner who they left in 
order to have the means to enter a new lease:101  
 
In some cases, the barriers to affordable and stable housing forced women to accept 
help from the violent ex-partner who was offering money or assistance in signing 
leases. As a result, women and children experienced further violence and other abuse. 
 
Even if the damages award is a joint award with the abusive partner, it may have an unequal 
effect as payments are likely to be disproportionately borne by women. There are gendered 
differences that contribute to women’s vulnerability, including that:102  
 
… women are more likely to honour debt, since clean debt records enable caring for 
children through housing tenancies and contracts for household goods and services. 
This makes them vulnerable to carrying a debt once a partner has left the scene, or 
maintaining the payment of debt within a relationship.  
 
  
99 Rasheedah Phillips "Addressing Barriers to Housing for Women Survivors of Domestic Violence and 
Sexual Assault" (2015) 24(2) Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 323 at 324. 
100 Taryn Champion and others "The impact of housing on the lives of women and children - post domestic 
violence crisis accommodation" (study undertaken by the NSW Women Refuge Movement and the UWS 
Urban Research Centre, February 2009). The United States literature similarly draws connections between 
family violence and homelessness, see for example Kristen M Ross, 'Eviction, Discrimination, and Domestic 
Violence: Unfair Housing Practices against Domestic Violence Survivors' (2007) 18 Hastings Women's LJ 
249 at 250-251; Tara Vrettos "Victimizing the Victim: Evicting Domestic Violence Victims from Public 
Housing Based on the Zero-Tolerance Policy" (2002) 9 Cardozo Journal of Law and Gender 97 at 100. 
101 Taryn Champion and others "The impact of housing on the lives of women and children - post domestic 
violence crisis accommodation" (study undertaken by the NSW Women Refuge Movement and the UWS 
Urban Research Centre, February 2009) at 4. 
102 Sandra Milne and others "Economic Abuse in New Zealand: Towards an understanding and response" 
(Good Shepherd Australia New Zealand, 2018) at 16. In the United States context, Desmond’s research has 
revealed the gendered dimensions of tenancies where he concluded “it is women who disproportionately face 
eviction’s fallout”: see Matthew Desmond "Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty" (2012) 118 
American Journal of Sociology 88 at 91. 
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Damages awards are generally made without any consideration of these matters as the 
focus is on compensating the landlord, not the ability of the tenant to pay. However, 
understanding these factors might give further encouragement to think carefully about 
interpreting the RTA in a way that places liability on the tenant-victim for damages; there 
are significant ongoing costs that damage the effort to effectively respond to family 
violence.  
B. Procedural Safeguards in the Tribunal 
In addition to speaking directly to housing and family violence policy, this exploration may 
also provide some warning about the vulnerabilities that can occur in a lawyer-less forum. 
The RTA has a strong presumption against the use of advocates,103 with the intention 
behind this to level the playing field. In practice however, this policy can just strengthen 
imbalance.104 Property managers with large portfolios – including agencies such as Kāinga 
Ora – can appear multiple times, building up expertise and trust with the Tribunal, and 
well-recognised repeat-player advantages.105 Victims of family violence are at a very 
substantial disadvantage. Tenants appear at low rates in the Tribunal across all cases but 
they may be even less likely to appear in a family violence case, where victims may fear 
giving evidence about the violence, may have relocated or may be attempting to keep their 
location private. Thought, therefore, needs to be given to the use of trained advocates who 
can appear in cases where the tenant is vulnerable, and particularly where the landlord is a 
repeat player. This does not need to be the use of lawyers, which has obvious cost 
implications, but tenancy or family violence advocates could provide useful balance.106 
  
103 Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 93. 
104 This has long been recognised in the United States; see for example Barbara Bezdek "Silence in the Court: 
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process" (1991) 20 Hofstra Law Review 
533; Carroll Seron, Martin Frankel and Gregg Van Ryzin "The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for 
Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment" (2001) 35 Law & 
Soc Rev 419. 
105 Marc Galanter "Why the 'Haves' Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change" (1974) 
9(1) Law & Soc Rev 95. 
106 See for example, the pilot for Licenced Legal Advocates in Arizona for family violence related legal 
issues, including housing: Innovation for Justice Program "Report to the Arizona Supreme Court Task Force 
on Delivery of Legal Services: Designing a New Tier of Civil Legal Professional for Survivors of Domestic 
Violence" (University of Arizona James E Rogers College of Law, 2019) .  
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These advocates would be able to amass sufficient status and experience – like the property 
managers and social housing representatives – to harness the advantages of repeat-player 
status. Again, this recognises the context in which the law is actually operating on the 
ground, rather than applying seemingly neutral provisions that operate unfairly in practice 




The drafting of the RTA allows space for an interpretation that both takes into account the 
context of family violence and the policy attempts to prevent family violence. Indeed, s 85 
requires attention to substantive merit of cases and could be said to encourage such a 
reading. This does not require a law change but only a reading that is not biased in favour 
of those who have the physical and social power to control who comes into their home and 
what they do once admitted. This understanding of the context of family violence could 
also help the adjudicators to apply the evidentiary requirements more fairly. In only one 
area is a law change suggested: a more generous provision to allow advocates to appear on 
behalf of victims in the Tribunal. This minor change, and interpreting the RTA to recognise 
the realities of family violence, would ensure that tenancy law and practice supports the 
strategy of keeping victims of family violence safe.  
 
 
 
